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"CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW . "* 
0. ] ohn Rogget 
AT the last term the Supreme Court in a series of cases had be-fore it questions of the meaning and scope of "the sweeping 
command"1 of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make 
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " 
The questions which most of these cases presented in one aspect 
or another concerned the problem of the circumstances, if any, 
under which speech that has not yet resulted in criminal deeds 
can constitutionally be punished, restrained or regulated. Five 
cases involved obscenity statutes. These covered the field, on a 
federal as well as a state level, in the criminal as well as the civil 
area. In Roth v. United States2 the Court sustained the validity 
of a federal criminal obscenity statute, and in Alberts v. Cali-
fornia8 a state criminal obscenity statute. The Court in an opinion 
by Justice Brennan held "that obscenity is not within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech or press."4 Justices Black and 
Douglas dissented in both cases, and Justice Harlan in the Roth 
case. Justice Douglas in his dissent, in which Justice Black con-
curred, stated: "Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and 
to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to 
be an inseparable part of it."5 Justice Harlan dissented on the 
ground that the First Amendment's prohibitions placed a greater 
•This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed. 
tMember, New York Bar; A.B. 1922, University of Illinois, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1931, 
Harvard; formerly (1939-40) United States Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; author, Our Vanishing Civil Liberties 
(1949).-Ed. 
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 631 (1919) (dissenting opinion of Justice 
Holmes). 
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957), affirming (2d Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 796. 
a 354 U.S. 476 (1957), affirming 138 Cal. App. (2d) 909, 292 P. (2d) 90 (1955). 
4Id. at 485. 
l>Id. at 514. 
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restriction on federal power than the Fourteenth Amendment's 
provision~ "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law," placed on state power. 
In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown6 the Court in a five to four 
decision upheld a New York statute which provided for civil 
non-jury injunctive proceedings against obscene publications. 
Justice Frankfurter delivered the Court's opinion. He did not 
think that the statute constituted proscribed prior restraint. Jus-
tices Douglas and Black thought that it did. Chief Justice Warren 
in his dissent stated: "It is the manner of use that should deter-
mine obscenity. It is the conduct of the individual that should 
he judged, not the quality of art or literature. To do otherwise 
is to impose a prior restraint and hence to violate the Constitu-
tion. "7 Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that "the ab-
sence in this New York obscenity statute of a right to jury trial 
is a fatal defect."8 In Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of 
N ewarkg the Court on the authority of the preceding three cases 
in a per curiam decision sustained the validity of a Newark 
ordinance which forbade stage performers to expose certain parts 
of their bodies and to use profane, lewd or lascivious language. 
In the fifth case, Butler v. Michigan,1° the Court unanimously 
invalidated. a state statute which made criminal the general sale 
or distribution of literature "tending to incite minors." For 
otherwise, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, the "incidence" 
_o~ such legislation would be "to reduce the adult population ... 
to reading only what is fit for children."11 
_. · Six cases involved judgments of conviction under the Smith 
Act against leaders of the American Communist Party. Two of 
these cases, Scales v. United States12 and Lightfoot v. United 
States,13 arose out of prosecutions against individuals under that 
provision of the act which makes it a crime to be a member of 
an organization that advocates the forcible overthrow of the gov-
6 354 U.S. 436 (1957), affirming I N.Y. (2d) 177, 134 N.E. (2d) 461 (1956), affirming 
208 Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S. (2d) 735 (1955). 
7Id. at 446. 
s Id. at 447. 
9 354 U.S. 931 (1957), affirming 22 N.J. 472, 126 A. (2d) 340 (1956), reversing ll9 N.J. 
Super. 111, 120 A. (2d) 496 (1956). 
10 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
11 Id. at 383. 
12 350 U.S. 992 (1956), granting cert. to (4th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 581. 
13 350 U.S. 992 (1956), granting cert. to (7th Cir. 1956) 228 F. (2d) 861. 
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ernment, "knowing the purposes thereof."14 The Court heard 
arguments in these two cases but restored them to the docket 
for reargument at the 1957 term.111 The fact that Justices Brennan 
and Whittaker were not on the Court when these cases were 
argued may help to account for this result. 
The remaining four of these six cases arose out of conspiracy 
prosecutions. Three, Yates v. United States,16 Schneiderman v. 
United States,11 and Richmond v. United States,18 resulted from 
a judgment of conviction against fourteen persons in the Los 
Angeles prosecution. The Court reversed, ordering an acquittal 
as to five of the defendants and a new trial as to the remaining 
nine. Justice Harlan wrote the Court's opinion. Justices Brennan 
and Whittaker, who were not members of the Court when these 
cases were argued, took no part in their consideration or decision. 
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in part and dissented in 
part: they would have directed the acquittal of all of the defend-
ants. Justice Clark dissented. One of the grounds of the reversal 
was the trial judge's refusal to charge, in terms of the trial court's 
charge in Dennis v. United States,19 that the advocacy of violent 
overthrow "be of a rule or principle of action and by language 
reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such 
H 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1956) §2385. 
15 353 U.S. 979 (1957). At the 1957 term the Court in each of these two cases an-
nounced per curiam: "Upon consideration of the entire record and the confession of 
error by the Solicitor General, the judgment •.. is reversed. Jencks v. United States, 
353 U.S. 657." 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 3115 (Oct. 14, 1957). 
16 354 U.S. 298 (1957), reversing (9th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 146. Yates further re-
ceived various contempt sentences for refusal to answer questions put to her on cross-
examination. On appeal some of these were reversed and some affirmed. Yates v. United 
States, (9th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 851, 227 F. (2d) 848, 227 F. (2d) 844. One of those which 
was affirmed went to the Supreme Court. 350 U.S. 947 (1956), granting cert. to 227 F. 
(2d) 851. The Court heard argument but restored the case ,to the calendar along with 
Brown v. United States, 352 U.S. 908 (1956), granting cert. to (6th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 
140 (refusal to answer questions on cross-examination in a denaturalization proceeding) 
for reargument at the 1957 ,term. 354 U.S. 907 (1957). At the 1957 term the Court, in a 
six-to-three decision, sustained the contempt conviction of Yates on one specification but 
vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for re-sentencing. 78 
S. Ct. 128 (1957). 
17 354 U.S. 298. The petitioner in this case was the same as the one in Schneiderman 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), a denaturalization proceeding, in which the Court 
in a five-to-three decision, with Justice Murphy writing the majority opinion and Chief 
Justice Stone the dissenting one, held that the government had not proved by "clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence" that the Communist Party in the five years before 
1927 had advocated the overthrow of our government by force and violence. Wendell 
L. Willkie, a big business lawyer as well as leader, and Republican presidential candidate 
in 1940, successfully represented the petitioner. 
1B ll54 U.S. 298. 
19 ll41 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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action, all with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction 
of the Government of the United States by force and violence 
as speedily as circumstances would permit."20 Instead the trial 
judge charged: 
"The kind of advocacy and teaching which is charged 
and upon which your verdict must be reached is not merely 
a desirability but a necessity that the Government of the 
United States be overthrown and destroyed by force and vio-
lence and not merely a propriety but a duty to overthrow and 
destroy the Government of the United States by force and 
violence. "21 
The Court felt that this instruction defined advocacy too much 
in terms of the teaching of abstract doctrine rather than incite-
ment to illegal action: "The distinction between advocacy of 
abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful 
action is one that has been consistently recognized in the opinions 
of this Court, beginning with Fox v. Washington . .. and Schenck 
v. United States . ... "22 Justices Black and Douglas dissented on 
the same ground as in the Dennis case, that the advocacy provi-
sions of the Smith Act violated the First Amendment. Justice 
Black, in an opinion in which Justice Douglas joined, wrote: 
"I believe that the First Amendment forbids Congress to punish 
people for talking about public affairs, whether or not such dis-
cussion incites to action, legal or illegal. "23 Justice Clark could 
not draw the distinctions which the Court did between the charge 
in the Dennis case and that in the instant cases: "While there 
may be some distinctions between the charges, as I view them 
they are without material difference. I find, as the majority inti-
mates, that the distinctions are too 'subtle and difficult to 
grasp.' "24 
In the sixth Communist case, Wellman v. United States,25 
20 Id. at 512. 
21354 U.S. at 314-315. 
22 Id. at 318. 
23 Id. at 340. 
24 Id. at 350. Subsequently the district court, on the motion of the government, dis. 
missed the indictment as to the nine, and, on its own motion, added a tenth who was not 
tried with the others because of illness. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1957, p. 71:4. 
25 354 U.S. 931 (1957), vacating judgment in (6th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 757. In a 
seventh case, Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. I (1956), reversing (3d Cir. 1955) 223 
F. (2d) 449, affirming (W.D. Pa. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 345, involving a judgment of convic-
tion against five persons in the Pittsburgh prosecution, the Court directed the granting 
of a new trial after the government advised the Court that it had serious reason to 
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arising out of a conspiracy conviction in Detroit, the Court vacat-
ed the judgment of affirmance of the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, and remanded the case for further consideration 
in the light of the Court's decision in the Yates, Schneiderman and 
Richmond cases. Again Justice Clark dissented. 
One case dealt with a state anti-picketing statute: in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.,26 the Court in a 
five-to-three decision sustained the validity of a Wisconsin statute 
which prohibited even peaceful picketing when done for organi-
zational purposes. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion in 
which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined, urged that 
speech when unconnected with conduct should be wholly free: 
"I would return to the test enunciated in Giboney-that this form 
of expression can be regulated or prohibited only to the extent 
that it forms an essential part of a course of conduct which the 
State can regulate or prohibit."27 
Two additional cases involved contempt sentences of wit-
nesses who refused to answer inquiries put to them by govern-
mental authorities, but who did not invoke the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. In Wat-
kins v. United States,28 a labor union organizer admitted com-
munist associations but refused to name names. He acknowledged 
before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities: "I would like to make it clear that for a period of 
time from approximately 1942 to 1947 I cooperated with the 
Communist Party and participated in Communist activities to 
such a degree that some persons may honestly believe that I was 
a member of the party."29 Yet he refused to identify former 
communists, saying: ". . . I do not believe that any law in this 
country requires me to testify about persons who may in the past 
doubt the truthfulness of the testimony of one of its witnesses, Joseph D. Mazzei, who 
was a paid informer of the government. The solicitor general disclosed this situation 
to the Court in a motion to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Instead the Court ordered a new trial. The petitioner Mesarosh is also known as Nelson, 
and was the successful defendant in another case, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 
(1956), affirming 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), reversing 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. 
(2d) 431 (1952), in which the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania sedition law, and cast 
doubt on such laws of other states, on the ground that the federal Smith Act pre-empted 
the field. 
26 354 U.S. 284 (1957), affirming 270 Wis. 315 at 321a, 74 N.W. (2d) 749 (1956). 
27 Id. at 297. 
28 354 U.S. 178 (1957), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 681. 
20 354 U.S. at 183. 
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have been Communist Party members or otherwise engaged in 
Communist Party activity but who to my best knowledge and 
belief have long since removed themselves from the Communist 
movement."30 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire31 a socialist who lec-
tured at the University of New Hampshire refused to answer 
the inquiries of the attorney general of New Hampshire about 
his lecture and about the activities of his wife and others in the 
formation of the Progressive Party in that state. The legislature 
of New Hampshire by a joint resolution had designated the at-
torney general as its agent for the investigation of subversive 
activities. In both cases the Court upset the sentences. In the 
Watkins case it also directed the dismissal of the indictment. Jus-
tice Clark dissented in both cases. Justice Burton joined him in 
the Sweezy case. In that case Justice Frankfurter in a concurring 
opinion quoted from a statement of a conference of senior schol-
ars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the 
Witwatersrand. One of the quoted paragraphs reads: 
" 'In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a 
means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its own 
nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sec-
tional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of 
free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-"to follow 
the argument where it leads." This implies the right to ex-
amine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and be-
liefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the con-
cept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of 
a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add 
and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to 
be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.' "32 
These cases call for a re-examination of the circumstances 
leading to the adoption of the federal bill of rights, the framers' 
intent in drafting the First Amendment, its subsequent construe-
30 Id. at 185. 
31354 U.S. 234 (1957), reversing 100 N.H. 103, 121 A. {2d) 783 (1956). 
32 354 U.S. at 262-263. In a third case, Raley v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929 (1957), vacating 
judgment in 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E. (2d) 104 (1956), a witness refused to answer 
questions of the Ohio Un-American Activities Committee, but on the basis of the Fifth 
Amendment. The Court in a per curiam decision remanded the case for further con-
sideration in the light of the Sweezy and Watkins decisions. At the 1957 term in Uphaus 
v. Wyman, 26 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3115 (Oct. 14, 1957), vacating judgment in 100 N.H. 436, 
130 A. (2d) 278, the Court remanded the case "for consideration in the light of Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234.'' The petitioner was Willard Uphaus, executive director 
of the New Hampshire World Fellowship Center, Inc. Subsequently the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court granted a motion to reinstate its original judgment. 136 A. (2d) 221 (1957). 
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tion, particularly the development and application of Justice 
Holmes' clear and present danger test, which he enuncia,ted in 
Schenck v. United States,33 and the respective areas of federal and 
state power. It is the position of the writer that, at least so far as 
Congress is concerned, speech is as free as thought, and that unless 
and until speech becomes a part of a course of conduct which 
Congress can restrain or regulate no federal legislative power 
over it exists. State power, despite the Fourteenth Amendment, 
may be somewhat more extensive. Certainly the framers of the 
First Amendment intended that it should be. This article will 
deal with federal power over speech. 
Founders' Assurances on Freedom 
The Constitution originally did not have a bill of rights be-
cause the delegates to the federal convention which proposed it 
did not feel that one was necessary. They had assembled in order 
to meet the need for strengthening the national government. 
They did not regard individual rights in danger, certainly not 
from that source. Besides, they thought that the states would 
protect individual rights. The first recognition of such rights 'by 
the Convention was an emendation in the handwriting of John 
Rutledge of South Carolina to the report of the Committee of 
Detail. This called for a jury trial in criminal cases in the state 
where the offense -was committed, 34 and became article III, sec-
tion 2, clause 3. In the closing weeks provisions were added against 
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and religious tests for federal 
office holders, and for the protection of the writ of habeas corpus. 
These are to be found in article I, sections 9 and 10, and article 
VI, clause 3. But that was all. Three days before the Convention 
adjourned Charles Pinkney of South Carolina, whose -original 
draft of a plan for a federal constitution did not contain a bill of 
rights,35 and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts_ moved to insert 
a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably 
observed .... " Roger Sherman _of Connecticut answered: "It is 
unnecessary-The power of Congress does -not extend to the 
33 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
34 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 144 (1911). A report written by 
Jame~ Wilson of Pennsylvania and edited by Rutledge contained a similar provision. 
Id. at 173. 
85 See Rtm.AND, THE BmTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 109 (1955). 
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Press." The record continues: "On the question, it passed in the 
negative."36 
However, the absence of a bill of rights became the strongest 
objection to the ratification of the Constitution. Its supporters 
countered with 'the argument that since the federal government 
was one of enumerated powers a bill of rights was unnecessary; 
indeed, it might even be dangerous, for it would furnish some 
ground for a contention that such an enumeration was exhaustiye. 
The earliest and leading protagonist of this double-barreled posi-
tion was James Wilson of Pennsylvania. In October 1787, less 
than a month after the federal convention had adjourned, he 
stated to a gathering in Philadelphia: 
" ... for it would have been superfluous and absurd, to have 
stipulated with a foederal body of our own creation, that we 
should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested 
either by the intention or the act that has brought that body 
into existence. For instance, the liberty of the press, which 
has been a copious subject of declamation and opposition: 
what controul can proceed from the foederal government, to 
shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom? 
If, indeed, a power similar to that which has heen granted for 
the regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate 
literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stipu-
late that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate, 
as that the impost should be general in its operation .... "37 
The next month in the Pennsylvania convention on the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution he contended: 
" ... But in a government consisting of enumerated powers, 
such as is proposed for the United States, a bill of rights 
would not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble judgment, 
highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and 
rights which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of 
rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the 
powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every thing 
that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The conse-
quence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all 
implied power into the scale of the government, and the 
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. On the 
other hand, an imperfect enumeration of the powers of gov-
36 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 617-618 (1911); 5 ELuor, DEBATES 
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, rev. ed., 545 (1866). 
37 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION, Ford ed., 156 (1888). 
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ernment reserves all implied power to the people; and by 
that means the constitution becomes incomplete. But of the 
two, it is much safer to run the risk on the side of the con;. 
stitution; for an omission in the enumeration of the powers 
of government is neither so dangerous nor important as an 
omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people."88 
The following year Alexander Hamilton of New York in 
The Federalist, No. 84, put Wilson's argument in its best-known 
form, although the last instalment of this number did not come 
from the press until after New York, the eleventh state, had rati-
fied the Constitution. Thus this number had little actual effect 
on the political course of events. Hamilton reasoned: 
"I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense 
and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not 
only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would 
even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions 
to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would af-
ford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. 
For why declare that things shall not be done which there is 
no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the 
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power 
is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not 
contend that such a provision would confer a regulating 
power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men dis-
posed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. 
They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Con-
stitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of pro-
viding against the abuse of an authority which was not given, 
and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the 
press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe 
proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested 
in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of 
the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine 
of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious 
zeal for bills of rights. "39 
Thomas Jefferson, who was then our minister to France, in 
a letter of December 20, 1787 from Paris, to his friend James 
Madison, answered Wilson's argument: 
" ... I will now add what I do not like. First the omission 
of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of 
88 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed., 436-437 (1866). 
39 At p. 559 (Modern Library ed.). 
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sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, pro-
tection against standing armies, restrictions against monop:. 
olies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus 
laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the 
laws of the land and not by the law of Nations. To say, as 
Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary be-
cause all is reserved in the case of the general government 
which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given 
which is not reserved might do for the Audience to whom it 
was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, opposed by strong 
inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from 
the omission of the clause of our present confederation which 
had declared that in express terms .... "40 
Madison at first espoused Wilson's thesis. In the Virginia con-
vention in June 1788 on the ratification of the Constitution he 
argued: " ... Can the general government exercise any power not 
delegated? If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not 
be implied that everything omitted is given to the general govern-
ment? Has not the honorable gentleman [Patrick Henry] himself 
admitted that an imperfect enumeration is dangerous? . . ."41 
After further debate he took the position that while he was 
not ~gainst amendments he was opposed to a bill of rights: 
"Mr. MADISON conceived that what defects might be in 
the Constitution might be removed by the amendatory mode 
in itself. As to a solemn declaration of our essential rights, 
he thought it unnecessary and dangerous-unnecessary, be-
cause it was evident that the general government had no 
power but what was given it, and that the delegation alone 
warranted the exercise of power; dangerous, because an 
enumeration which is not complete is not ·safe. Such an 
· enumeration could not be made, within any compass of time, 
40 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Boyd ed., 440 (1955). Article II of the 
Articles of Confederation 1778 provided: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, 
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this con-
federation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." 
· Editors have taken too many liberties with Jefferson. For example, Saul K. Padover 
in his THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON (1943) inserts (at 121) after the- words "gratis dictum" 
the comment "the reverse of which might just as well be said." 
Hart, "Power of Government Over Speech and Press,'' 29 YALE L. J. 410 at 412 
(1920), attributes to Jefferson an answer to Hamilton which, while it is in accord with 
the-substance of his remarks on a bill of rights in his letters of December 20, 1787 and 
March 15, 1789 to Madison, is probably spurious. See Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and 
of the Mails,'' 36 MICH. L. REv. 703 at 714, n. 37 (1938). One wonders how many hours 
researchers have spent vainly trying to track down the authenticity of materials resulting 
from such attempts to improve on history. _ 
41 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed., 620 (1866). 
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as would be equal to a general negation, such as his honorable 
friend (Mr. Wythe) had proposed. He declared that such 
amendments as seemed, in his judgment, to be without dan-
ger, he would readily admit, and that he would be the last 
to oppose any such amendment as would give satisfaction to 
any gentleman, unless it were dangerous."42 
However, on October 17, 1788 he wrote to Jefferson: 
" ... My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of 
rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not 
meant to be included in the enumeration. At the same time 
I have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been 
anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any 
other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I 
have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and 
if properly executed could not be of disservice. I have not 
viewed it in an important light-I. because I concede that 
in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. 
Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner 
in which the federal powers are granted. 2 because there is 
great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the 
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite 
latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, 
if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much 
more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power .... 
3 because the limited powers of the federal Government and 
the jealousy of the subordinate Governments, afford a secu-
rity which has not existed in the case of the State Govern-
ments, and exists in no other .... "43 
Jefferson in a letter of March 15, 1789 from Paris answered 
him. As to his second point he countered: "Half a loaf is better 
than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure 
what we can." And as to his third, that a bill of rights would furn-
ish a text whereby the state governments "will try all the acts 
of the federal government." In the beginning of his letter he 
stated: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, 
you omit one which has great weight with me, the legal check 
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, 
which if rendered independent & kept strictly to their own de-
partment merits great confidence for their learning & integrity.''44 
42 Id. at 626-627. 
43 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 271-272 (1904). 
44 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Fed. ed. by Ford, 461-463 (1904). 
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Madison, under the impact of his correspondence with his 
friend Jefferson and the general demands for a bill of rights, 
changed his position, and became the principal draftsman of the 
first Ten Amendments. After studying the proposals of the various 
states he prepared his own set of amendments, which he laid 
before the first Congress in June 1789. In doing so he explained: 
"The first of these amendments relates to what may be 
called a bill of rights. I will own that I never considered this 
provision so essential to the federal constitution, as to make 
it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was added; 
at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form, 
and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither im-
proper nor altogether useless. . . . 
" ... The people of many States have thought it necessary 
to raise barriers against power in all forms and departments 
of Government, and I am inclined to believe, if once bills 
of rights are established in all the States, as well as the federal 
constitution, we shall find that although some of them are 
rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a 
salutary tendency .... 
"But whatever may be the form which the several States 
have adopted in making declarations in favor of particular 
rights, the great object in view is to limit and qualify the 
powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of 
power those cases in which the Government ought not to 
act, or to act only in a particular mode .... 
" ... It has been said, that in the Federal Government 
they [ declarations of rights] are unnecessary, because the 
powers are enumerated, and it follows, that all that are not 
granted by the constitution are retained; that the constitu-
tion is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of 
the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so neces-
sary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the Gov-
ernment. I admit that these arguments are not entirely with-
out foundation; but they are not conclusive to the extent 
which has been supposed. It is true, the powers of the Gen-
eral Government are circumscribed, they are directed to par-
ticular objects; but even if Government keeps within those 
limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the 
means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the 
same manner as the powers of the State Governments under 
their constitutions may to an indefinite extent; because in the 
constitution of the United States, there is a clause granting to 
Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested 
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in the Government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof; this enables them to fulfil every pur-
pose for which the Government was established. Now, may 
not laws be considered necessary and proper by Congress, for 
it is for them to judge of the necessity and propriety to ac-
complish those special purposes which they may have in con-
templation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary 
nor proper; as well as improper laws could be enacted by the 
State Legislatures, for fulfilling the more extended objects of 
those Governments. I will state an instance, which I think in 
point, and proves that this might be the case. The General 
Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be neces-
sary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collec-
tion are within the direction of the Legislature: may not 
general warrants be considered necessary for the pur-
pose ... ?"45 
In other words in certain areas the federal government was 
either not to act at all, or else to act only in a particular manner. 
In the instances of freedom of speech and of the press it was not 
to act at all. During the course of the debates on his proposals he 
pointed out: " ... The right of freedom of speech is secured; the 
liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach 
of this Government .... "46 
When he submitted his proposals in June he took occasion 
to meet the argument that bills of rights were ineffective: " ... It is 
true, there are a few particular States in which some of the most 
valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been violated; 
but it does not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a 
salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are incorporated 
into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will con-
sider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those 
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be 
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. 
Besides this security there is a great probability that such a decla-
ration in the federal system would be enforced; because the State 
Legislatures will jealously and closely watch the operations of 
45 I ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Gales comp.. 436-438 (1834~ 
The portions of the ANNALS relating to the First Ten Amendments in the first Congress 
are reprinted in PATIERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 93-217 (1955). 
46 I ANNALS at 738. 
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this Government, and be able to resist with more effect every 
assumption of power, than any other power on earth can do; and 
the greatest opponents to a Federal Government admit the State 
Legislatures to be sure guardians of the people's liberty ... .''47 
"Here," in the words of Irving Brant, "was not only the doctrine 
of judicial review but the lusty germ of the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions .... "48 
Framers' Intent 
By the unqualified prohibitions of the First Amendment the 
framers intended to accomplish a double purpose: they "sought," 
in the words of Professor Zechariah Chafee, "to preserve the 
fruits of the old victory abolishing the censorship, and to achieve 
a new victory abolishing sedition prosecutions. "49 The struggle 
against censorship, against prior restraint, had been won in 
England in 1695 when the House of Commons declined to ex-
tend the then existing licensing law, which expired in that year. 
The House of Lords voted for renewal but, when the Commons 
insisted, acquiesced. One would like to feel that Milton's Areopa-
gitica contributed to this result. According to Macaulay, however, 
the end of licensing was due to the petty grievances involved in 
enforcing it.50 
But prosecutions for seditious libel remained. Blackstone 
explained in his Commentaries (1769): 
" ... The liberty of the press is, indeed, essential to the nature 
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous re-
straints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure 
for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an 
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the 
public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; 
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, 
he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To sub-
ffliU~ . 
48 BRANT, JAMES MADISON FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 267 (1950). All of Jefferson's 
private letters came by diplomatic pouch, so that his letter of March 15, 1789 probably 
reached Madison before the latter presented his proposed amendments to the House 
on June 8, 1789. See Cahn, "The Firstness of the First Amendment," 65 YALE L. J. 
464 at 467, n. 12 (1956). 
49 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1941). 
50 6 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, new ed., 360-373, 7 id. at 168-169 (1897). See also 
Emerson, "The Doctrine of Prior Restraint," 20 LAw & CoNTEM • .PROB. 648 at 650-651 
, (1955). In the colonies licensing came to an end by 1725. See DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS 89, n. 2 (1906). 
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ject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was 
formerly done, both before and since the revolution, is to 
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one 
man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all 
controverted points in learning, religion, and government. 
But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or 
offensive writings, which, when published, shall, on a fair 
and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is 
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of 
government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil 
liberty .... "51 
Thus the crown found such prosecutions a fairly good substi-
tute for the old censorship. 
Blackstone explained, too, the theory underlying these prose-
cutions: 
". . . The direct tendency of these libels is the breach of 
the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to re-
venge, and perhaps to bloodshed. The communication of a 
libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law; 
and, therefore, the sending an abusive private letter to a man 
is as much a libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally 
tends to a breach of the peace. For the same reason, it is im-
material, with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the 
matter of it be true or false; since the provocation, and not 
the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally; though, 
doubtless, the falsehood of it may aggravate its guilt and en-
hance its punishment. In a civil action, we may remember, a 
libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; for, if the 
charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, 
and has no ground to demand a compensation for himself, 
whatever offense it may be against the public peace; and, 
therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may 
be pleaded in bar of the suit. But, in a criminal prosecution, 
the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and 
to disturb the public peace, is the whole that the law consid-
"52 ers .... 
51 Vol. 4 at •!51-152. 
52 4 id. at •150-151. Coke in De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 
at 251 (1606), explained: "Every libel . • • is made either against a private man, or 
against a magistrate or public person. If it be against a private man it deserves a severe 
punishment, for although tbe libel be made against one, yet it incites all those of tbe 
same family, kindred, or society to revenge, and so tends per consequens to quarrels 
and breach of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of blood and of great in-
convenience: if it be against a magistrate, or other public person, it is a greater offence; 
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Hence arose the explanation in criminal libel prosecut10ns as 
distinct from civil suits for libel that "the greater the truth the 
greater the libel."53 
One's position on the crime of seditious libel depended on 
one's view of the nature of the relationship between those in 
positions of governmental authority and the people. In England, 
despite the victory over censorship in 1695, the people generally 
continued to regard the rulers as their superiors who could not 
be subjected to any censure that would tend to diminish their 
authority. The people could not criticize them directly in news-
papers or pamphlets, but only through their lawful representa-
tives in parliament, who might be petitioned in an orderly 
manner.154 
But the framers of the First Amendment regarded those in 
positions of governmental authority as the servants of the people. 
Accordingly the people might find fault with them as they saw 
fit, as well as discuss freely questions of governmental policy. As 
Madison explained in the Third Congress, "If we advert to the 
nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the cen-
sorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in 
the Government over the people."55 Under this view the crime 
for it concerns not only the breach of the peace, but also the scandal of Government; 
for what greater scandal of Government can there be than to have corrupt or wicked 
magistrates to be appointed and constituted by the King to govern his subjects under 
him? ••• " Stephen calls this "the nearest approach to a definition of the crime with 
which I am acquainted." 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 348 (1883). He 
also comments (at 304) that "even in Coke it would be difficult to find anything less 
satisfactory." 
53 See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 499-500 (1941); Schofield, "Freedom 
of the Press in the United States," in 2 EssAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 510 
at 516 (1921). 
54 See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 8-22 (1941); 8 HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 336-346 (1926); 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF ENGLAND 299-300 (1883); SMITH, FREEDOM'S FEITERS 146, 418-421 (1956); Schofield, 
"Freedom of the Press in the United States," in 2 EssAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
EQUITY 520-521 (1921). 
55 ANNALS 934, 3d Cong., 2d sess. (Nov. 27, 1794). See also, e.g., the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights (1776), written by George Mason, which provided in the second paragraph: 
"That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates 
are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them." 
Most of the states had comparable provisions. GA. CONST., preamble (1777); Mo. 
CONST., Declaration of Rights, §1 (1776); MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. V 
(1780); N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, art. VIII (1784); N.C. CONST., Declaration of Rights, 
§1 (1776); PA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, §4 (1776); S.C. CONST., art. IX, §1 (1790); 
VT. CONST., Declaration of Rights, ch. I, §5 (1777), CONST. Declaration of Rights, ch. I, 
§6 (1786). 
When the Federal Convention of 1787 took up the manner of choosing the chief 
1958] "CoNGREss SHALL MAKE No LAw ... " 347 
of seditious libel was a thing of the past. Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen pointed out in his History of the Criminal Law of Eng-
land: "To those who hold this view fully and carry it out to all 
its consequences there can be no such offense as sedition. There 
may indeed be breaches of the peace which may destroy or en-
danger life, limb, or property, and there may be incitements 
to such offenses, but no imaginable censure of the government, 
short of a censure which has an immediate tendency to produce 
such a breach of the peace, ought to be regarded as criminal."56 
It was this view which was embodied in the unqualified prohibi-
tions of the First Amendment. 
A few years after its adoption when Talleyrand, the French 
foreign minister, complained to the American envoys Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry about 
the insults and calumnies in the American press against the 
French Government, they replied in a memorial drafted by 
Marshall: 
"The genius of the Constitution, and the opinions of the 
people of the United States, cannot be overruled by those 
who administer the Government. Among those principles 
deemed sacred in America; among those sacred rights con-
sidered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the 
Government contemplates with awful reverence, and would 
approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there 
is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed 
on the public mind than the liberty of the press. That this 
liberty is often carried to excess, that it has sometimes de-
generated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented; but the 
remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil 
inseparable from the good with which it is allied: perhaps 
it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk, with-
out wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. How-
executive, Mason made this point in converse fashion: " ..• Having for his primary 
object, for the pole star of his political conduct, the preservation of the rights of the 
people, he held it as an essential point, as ·the very palladium of Civil liberty, that the 
great officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed periods return to 
that mass from which they -were at first taken, in order that they may feel &: respect 
those rights &: interests, Which are again to be personally valuable to them. . • ." 
2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 119-120 (1911). Madison in the proposed 
amendments which he put before the first Congress borrowed from the second paragraph 
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. In his first amendment he proposed: "That there 
be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all power is orginally vested in, and 
consequently derived from, the people." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (1789). 
L6 Vol. 2 at 300 (1883). 
348 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [Vol. 56 
ever desirable those measures might be which might correct 
without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised 
in America. No regulations exist which enable the Govern-
ment to suppress whatever calumnies or invectives any in-
dividual may choose to offer to the public eye; or to punish 
such calumnies and invectives, otherwise than by a legal 
prosecution in courts which are alike open to all who con-
sider themselves as injured. "57 
Sedition Act of 1798 
In Dennis v. United. States58 Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, 
in an opinion in which Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton joined, 
commented: "No important case involving free speech was de-
cided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919)."59 However, there were two prior great occasions when 
the scope of the First Amendment's proscriptions against any 
law abridging freedom of speech and of the press were thoroughly 
debated, and a conclusion finally and generally reached against 
any exceptions: at the time of the Sedition Act of 1798;60 and 
after President Andrew Jackson in December 1835 proposed to 
Congress the passage of a law which would prohibit the use of 
the mails for "incendiary publications intended to instigate the 
slaves to insurrection."61 
The Sedition Act of 1798 was passed during the course of 
what President John Adams later called "the half War with 
France."62 This act made it a penal offense to publish any false, 
scandalous and malicious writings against the government, the 
president or either house of Congress with the intent to bring 
them into disrepute or stir up hatred against them. However, 
the act entrusted the determination of criminality to the jury, 
thus adopting the reform embodied in Fox's Libel Act63 in Eng-
land, and in addition allowed truth as a defense. 
117 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 191 at 196 (1832). See also 2 BEV-
ERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 329-330 (1919). 
58 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
59 Id. at 503. 
60 I STAT. 596, July 14, 1798. 
61 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st sess., p. 10 (1836). See also 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE ,PRESIDENTS, Richardson ed., 147, 176 (1896). 
62 Letter of September 30, 1805 to Benjamin Rush. OLD FAMILY LETIER.5: COPIED 
FROM THE ORIGINALS FOR ALEXANDER BIDDLE, Series A, 78, 84 (1892). 
63 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792): " .•• on every such trial, the jury sworn to try the issue 
may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue ••• 
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The focal points of the opposition to this act were the Virginia 
Resolutions, drafted by Madison, and the Kentucky Resolutions, 
the first of which were drafted by Jefferson and the second of 
which may have been. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 de-
clared that the act "is not law, but is altogether void, and of no 
force" because it violated the First and Tenth Amendments: the 
First in "that libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally· with 
heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of 
federal tribunals."64 
_ Kentucky concluded with the resolve "that it does also believe, 
that, to take from the states all the powers of self-government, and 
transfer them to a general and consolidated government, without 
regard to the special government, and reservations solemnly 
agreed to in that compact, is not for the peace, happiness, or 
prosperity of these states; and that, therefore, this commonwealth 
is determined, as it doubts not its co-states are, to submit to un-
delegated and consequently unlimited powers in no man, or body 
of men, on earth .... "65 
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 added, " ... That, if those 
who administer the general government be permitted to trans-
gress the limits fixed by that compact, by a total disregard to 
the special delegations of power therein contained, an annihila-
tion of the state governments, and the creation, upon their ruins, 
of a general consolidated government,· will be the inevitable 
consequence ... ,"66 and suggested as a rightful remedy a nullifi-
cation by the states. 
Madison prepared not only the Virginia Resolutions but 
also an Address of the General Assembly to the People of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia to accompany those of 1798, and a 
Report which contained a point by point defense of them. He 
drew up the Report because the replies of the various states to 
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 were generally 
unfavorable. In the Address he quoted from the reply which 
Marshall drafted for himself and his fellow envoys to Talleyrand. 
and shall not be required or directed, by the court or judge ... to find the defendant-
... guilty, merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant .•. of the paper 
charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or in--
formation." 
64 4 Eu.xoT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed., 541 (1866). 
65 4 id. at 542-543. 
66 4 id. at 545. 
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He further explained that steps had already been taken which 
might lead to a consolidated government, standing armies and 
even a form of monarchy: " ... They consist- .. ·. In destroying, 
by the sedition act, the responsibility of public servants and public 
measures to the people, thus retrograding towards the exploded 
doctrine 'that the administrators of the Government are the mas-
ters, and not the servants, of the people,' and exposing America, 
which acquired the honour of taking the lead among nations 
towards perfecting political principles, to the disgrace of return-
ing first to ancient ignorance and barbarism."67 
In the Report Madison assailed the two arguments which the 
Federalists advanced in support of the act: that Congress had 
power to punish crimes under the common law of England; and 
that the First Amendment in prohibiting Congress from making 
any law impairing freedom of the press had created a power to 
punish the licentiousness of the press. He took the contention 
that under the express power of Congress to "suppress Insurrec-
tions"68 one could "imply the power to prevent insurrections, by 
punishing whatever may lead or tend to them,'' and in answer 
suggested that if libels tended to insurrections then the thing to 
do was to pass and execute laws for the suppression of insurrec-
tions: 
" ... But it surely cannot, with the least plausibility, be said, 
that the regulation of the press, and a punishment of libels, 
are exercises of a power to suppress insurrections. The most 
that could be said would be that the punishment of libels, 
if it had the tendency ascribed to it, might prevent the oc-
casion of passing or executing laws necessary and proper for 
the suppression of insurrections. 
". . . for if the power to suppress insurrections includes 
a power to punish libels, or if the power to punish includes 
a power to prevent, by all the means that may have that 
tendency, such is the relation and influence among the most 
67 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 339 (1906). A little over a decade 
after Madison in his Report cut the ground from under the argument that Congress 
had power to punish crime under the common law of England, the Supreme Court so 
ruled in a case which involved an indictment for a libel on the President and the Con-
gress. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 31 (1812). The Court specifically stated 
(at 32), "Although this question is brought up now, for the first time, to be decided by 
this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no 
-0ther case, for many years, has this jurisdiction been asserted; and -the general acquiescence 
<>f legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition." 
68 U.S. CONST,, art. I, §8, cl. 15. 
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remote subjects of legislation, that a power over a very few 
would carry with it a power over all. And it must be wholly 
immaterial whether unlimited powers be exercised under 
the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised under the 
name of unlimited means of carrying into execution limited 
powers."69 
He explained at length that the First Amendment's prohibi-
tion included not only the Blackstonian concept of previous re-
straint but subsequent punishment as well: it included any law. 
In this country the people were the masters, not the government, 
and hence had a greater freedom of animadversion. Especially 
in the case of the press the bad had to be taken with the good: 
"The freedom of the press under the common law is, 
in the def ens es of the Sedition Act, made to consist in an 
exemption from all previous restraint on printed publica-
tions by persons authorized to inspect and prohibit them. 
It appears to the committee that this idea of the freedom of 
the press can never be admitted to be the American idea of 
it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications 
would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous 
restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say that no 
laws should be passed preventing publications from being 
made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in 
case they should be made. 
"The essential difference between the British Govern-
ment and the American Constitutions will place this subject 
in the clearest light. 
"In the British Government the danger of encroachments 
on the rights of the people is understood to be confined to 
the executive magistrate. The representatives of the people 
in the Legislature are not only exempt themselves from dis-
trust, but are considered as sufficient guardians of the rights 
of their constituents against the danger from the Executive. 
Hence it is a principle, that the Parliament is unlimited in its 
power; or, in their own language, is omnipotent. Hence, 
too, all the ramparts for protecting the rights of the people-
such as their Magna Charta, their Bill of Rights, etc.-are 
not reared against the Parliament, but against the royal pre-
rogative. They are merely legislative precautions against 
executive usurpations. Under such a Government as this, an 
69 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 383-384 (1906); 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON 
THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION, 2d ed., 568 (1866). 
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exemption of the press from previous restraint, by licensers 
appointed by the King, is all the freedom that can be secured 
to it. 
"In the United States the case is all together different. 
The People, not the Government, possess the absolute sov-
ereignty. The Legislature, no less than the Executive, is 
under limitations of power. Encroachments are regarded as 
possible from the one as well as from the other. Hence, in the 
United States the great and essential rights of the people are 
secured against legislative as well as against executive ambi-
tion. They are secured, not by laws paramount to prerogative, 
but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the 
freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt not on-
ly from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Brit-
ain, but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to 
be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous 
inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of 
laws. 
"The state of the press, therefore, under the common 
law, cannot, in this point of view, be the standard of its 
freedom in the United States. . . . ' 
"The nature of governments elective, limited, and re-
sponsible in all their branches, may well be supposed to re-
quire a greater freedom of animadversion than might be 
tolerated by the genius of such a government as that of Great 
Britain ... . 
" ... Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper 
use of every thing, and in no instance is this more true than 
in that of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the 
practice of the States, that it is better to leave a few of its 
noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by prun-
ing them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the 
proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted 
by any who _reflect that to the press alone, chequered as it 
is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs 
which have been gained by reason and humanity over error 
and oppression; who reflect that to the same beneficent source 
the United States owe much of the lights which conducted 
them to the ranks of a free and independent nation, and 
which have improved their political system into a shape so 
auspicious to their happiness? ... The article of amendment, 
instead of supposing in Congress a power that might be 
exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not 
abridged, was meant as a positive denial to Congress of any 
po:wer whatever on the subject .... 
"Is, then, the Federal Government, it will be asked, des-
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titute of every authority for restraining the licentiousness of 
the press, and for shielding itself against the libelous attacks 
which may be made on those who administer it? 
"The Constitution alone can answer this question. If 
no such power be expressly delegated, and if it be not both 
necessary and proper to carry into execution an express 
power-above all, if it be expressly forbidden, by a declara-
tory amendment to the Constitution-the answer must be, 
that the Federal Government is destitute of all such author-
ity. 
". . . The peculiar magnitude of some of the powers 
necessarily committed to the Federal Government; the pe,cu-
liar duration required for the functions of some of its depart-
ments; the peculiar distance of the seat of its proceedings from 
the great body of its constituents; and the peculiar difficulty 
of circulating an adequate knowledge of them through any 
other channel; will not these considerations, some or other of 
which produced other exceptions from the powers of ordinary 
governments, all together, account for the policy of binding 
the hand of the Federal Government from touching the chan-
nel which alone can give efficacy to its responsibility to its 
constituents, and of leaving those who administer it to a 
remedy, for their injured reputations, under the same laws, 
and in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their 
liberties, and their properties?"70 
On the floor of Congress John Nicholas of Virginia pointed 
out the fallacy of the bad tendency doctrine and the danger in 
the position which gave Congress the power to punish other 
than acts. The occasion was the debate on the report of a select 
committee on petitions praying for a repeal of the alien and 
sedition laws. Nicholas cautioned: 
"The suggestion on which the authority over the press 
is founded, is, that seditious writings have a tendency to pro-
duce opposition to Government. What has a greater tend-
ency to fit men for insurrection and resistance to Govern-
ment, than dissolute, immoral habits, at once destroying love 
of order, and dissipating the fortune which gives an interest 
in society? 
"The doctrine that Congress can punish any act which 
has a tendency to hinder the execution of the laws, as well as 
acts which do hinder it, will, therefore, clearly entitle them 
70 6 id. (Madison) at 386-390, 392-393; 4 id. (Elliot} at 569-573. 
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to assume a general guardianship over the morals of the peo-
ple of the United States."71 
Such a result was of course contrary to anything this country's 
founders had in mind. 
The best contemporary estimate of the Sedition Act of 1798 
came from John Taylor of Caroline: 
" ... The design of substituting political for religious here-
sy, is visible in the visage of sedition laws. A civil priesthood or 
government, hunting after political heresy, is an humble 
imitator of the inquisition, which fines, imprisons, tortures 
and murders, sometimes mind, at others, body. It affects the 
same piety, feigned by priestcraft at the burning of an here-
tick; and its party supplies such exultations, as those exhibit-
ed at an auto da fe, by a populace. . . . "72 
The Federalists, although they used this act against their 
opponents, nevertheless lost the election of 1800; but it is im-
possible to say that the act contributed appreciably to the result. 
However, the attempt of the Federalists to renew the act in the 
closing days of the Adams administration failed, and the act 
expired by its own terms on March 3, 1801. The next day Jeffer-
son declared in his first inaugural address: 
"If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this 
Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undis-
711! ANNALS OF CONGRESS 3004-3005 (1799). Contemporary views support Professor 
Henry Schofield's conclusion: " .•• One of the objects of the Revolution was to get 
rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press .••• [T)he crime of 
sedition and liberty of the press as declared in the First Amendment cannot co-exist. . •• " 
"Freedom of the Press in the United States," in 2 ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw AND 
EQUITY 521-522, 536 (1921). 
Cooley wrote: " ... the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is 
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered orally there 
can .be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery 
and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword, if, while every man was at liberty to 
publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for 
harmless publications .•.. [T]heir [free speech guaranties] purpose has evidently been 
to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their 
right to a· free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every 
citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of 
public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority 
which the people have conferred upon them .•.• The evils to be prevented were not 
the censorship of the press merely, ,but any action of the government by means of which 
it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely 
essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." 2 
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., Carrington, 885-886 (1927). 
72 AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 437 (1950). 
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turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opin-
ion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I 
know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican 
government can not be strong, that this Government is not 
strong enough; but would the honest patriot, in the full tide 
of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so 
far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear 
that this Government, the world's best hope, may by possibil-
ity want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, 
on the contrary, the strongest Government on earth. I believe 
it the only one where every man, at the call of the law, 
would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet 
invasions of the public order as his own personal con-
cern. Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted 
with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted 
with the government of others? Or have we found angels in 
the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this 
question."73 
The general opinion, at least until the cold war period, has 
been that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First Amendment. 
After he became president, Jefferson pardoned all prisoners who 
were convicted under it and Congress eventually repaid all fines. 
Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United 
States,7'1 in which Justice Brandeis joined, wrote: " ... I wholly 
disagree with the argument of the Government that the First 
Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. 
History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that 
the United States through many years had shown its repentance 
for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed."76 
President Woodrow Wilson concluded that the act "cut perilously 
near the root of freedom of speech and of the press."76 
73 1 MESSAGES AND .p APERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, Richardson ed., 322 (1897). A select 
bibliography on the Sedition Act of 1798 will include, in addition to the writings of 
Madison and Jefferson: BRANT, JAMES MADISON FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1950); KoCH, 
JEFFERSON AND MADISON (1950); SCHACHNRR, THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1954); SMITH, FREE• 
DOM'S FETIERS (1956); Carroll, "Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist 
Period; The Sedition Act," 18 MICH. L. REv. 615 (1920); Schofield, "Freedom of the 
Press in the United States," in 2 EssAYS ON CoNsrrrUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 510 (1921). 
7¼ 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
75 Id. at 630. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 
343 U.S. 250 (1952), commented (at 289): " ••• I think today's better opinion regards the 
enactment as a breach of the First Amendment and certainly Mr. Justice Holmes and 
Mr. Justice Brandeis thought so." 
76 6 A HlsrOllY OF THE AMRRICAN PEOPLE, documentary ed., 39 (1918). 
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"Incendiary Publications" 
The second great occasion which called for a full discussion 
of the scope of the First Amendment was President Jackson's 
proposal for barring the use of the mails to what were then 
called "incendiary publications." The Senate referred President 
Jackson's proposal to a Special Committee with John C. Calhoun 
of South Carolina as Chairman and two Southern and two North-
ern members-the Senate Committee on the Post Office and Post 
Roads had but one Southern member. The Special Committee, 
despite its majority of Southern members, despite the vehemence 
of Northern anti-slavery agitation and the dissemination from the 
North of a volume of abolitionist literature throughout the 
South, and despite Calhoun's bitter antagonism to abolitionist 
literature and his intense desire for the enactment of some mea-
sure to avoid the horrible insurrection which he feared those 
activities were engendering, reported adversely on President 
Jackson's proposal on the ground that the First Amendment for-
bade any such measure. In support of its conclusions the Com-
mittee cited Madison's Report on the Sedition Act of 1798. The 
Committee stated: 
". . . while they agree . . . as to the evil and its highly 
dangerous tendency, and the necessity of arresting it, they 
have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which 
he recommends. 
"After the most careful and deliberate investigation they 
have been constrained to adopt the conclusion that Congress 
has not the power to pass such a law .... 
"In the discussion on the point, the Committee do not 
deem it necessary to inquire whether the right to pass such 
a law can_ be derived from the power to establish post offices 
and post roads, or from the trust 'of preserving the relation 
created by the constitution between the States,' as supposed 
by the President. However ingenious or plausible the argu-
ments may be to derive the right from these, or any other 
sources, they must fall short of their object. The jealous 
spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors at the pe-
riod when the constitution was adopted, forever closed the 
door by which the right might be implied from any of the 
granted powers, or any other source, if there be any other. 
The committee refer to the amended article of the constitu-
tion which, among other things, provides that Congress shall 
pass no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press-a 
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prov1s1on which interposes, as will be hereafter shown, an 
insuperable objection to the measure recommended by the 
President. . . . " 
"That it was the object of this provision to place the 
freedom of the press beyond the possible interference of 
Congress, is a doctrine not now advanced for the first time. 
It is the ground taken, and so ably sustained by Mr. Madison, 
in his celebrated report to the Virginia Legislature, in 1799, 
against the alien and sedition law, and which conclusively 
settled the principle that Congress has no right, in any form, 
or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of the press. 
The establishment of this principle not only overthrew the 
sedition act, but was the cause of the great political revolu-
tion which, in 1801, brought the republican party, with Mr. 
Jefferson at its head, into power .... 
" ... Nothing is more clear than that the admission of the 
right, on the part of Congress, to determining what papers 
are incendiary, and as such to prohibit their circulation 
through the mail, necessarily involves the right to determine 
what are not incendiary, and to enforce their circulation .... 
It would give Congress, without regard to the prohibition 
laws of the States, the authority to open the gates to the flood 
of incendiary publications which are ready to break into 
those States, and to punish all who dare resist as criminals. 
Fortunately, Congress has no such right .... "77 
However, Calhoun as chairman prepared a bill which in its 
first section, as amended, made it unlawful "for any deputy post-
master, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, 
knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, 
newspaper, handbill, or other printed matter or pictorial repre-
sentation touching the subject of slavery, where, by the laws of 
the said State, Territory, or District, their circulation is prohibit-
77 S. Rep. ll8, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 1-5 (1836). The report is also set out in 49 NILES' 
WEEKLY REGISTER 408 (1836). The committee's observation that the struggle over the 
Sedition Act of 1798 caused a great political revolution which brought the Republican 
(Democratic) party into power is an overstatement. Schachner has pointed out: 
"Geographical divisions-the South against the North, with the Middle States waver-
ing uneasily in between-were far more potent influences; and had not changed since the 
preceding election or even the beginning of the nation. These were the same divisions 
that were to culminate in the great Civil War, and were bottomed on the same essential 
conflicts. Nor did the Alien and Sedition Acts contribute appreciably to the result-
another common claim that must •be dismissed. There is no evidence that any votes were 
shifted from one party to another because of them. Those who opposed the Acts had 
been Republicans before, and continued to be so. Jefferson had failed of election four 
years before by a hairsbreadth without their aid and benefit." ScHACHNER, THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS 549 (1954). . 
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ed; and any deputy postmaster who shall be guilty thereof, shall 
be forthwith removed from oflice."78 The Calhoun bill was like-
wise defeated: the vote against it was 25 to 19.79 In opposing 
Calhoun's bill Senator John Davis of Massachusetts reminded his 
colleagues: "The liberty of the press was not like the other re-
served rights, reserved by implication, but was reserved in ex-
press terms; it could not be touched in any manner."80 He had 
this further comment, which is even more pertinent today than 
when it was uttered: "The public morals were said to be in 
danger; it was necessary to prevent licentiousness, tumult, and 
sedition; and the public good required that the licentiousness 
should be restrained. All these were the plausible pretences un-
der which the freedom of the press had been violated in all 
ages .... "81 
Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky considered this bill "uncon-
stitutional; and if not so, that it contained a principle of a most 
dangerous and alarming character .... After much reflection he 
had come to the conclusion that they could not pass any law in-
terfering with the subject in any shape or form whatsoever .... 
The States alone had the power, and their power was ample for 
the purpose .... [T]he bill was calculated to destroy all the land-
marks of the constit,ution, establish a precedent for dangerous 
legislation, and to lead to incalculable mischief .... "8:►• 
Finally Daniel Webster, whose influence on the early devel-
opment of our constitutional principles was second only to that 
of Chief Justice Marshall, vehemently attacked the measure. He 
declared that the freedom of the press included "the liberty of 
printing as well as the liberty of publishing, in all the ordinary 
modes of publication; and was not the circulation of papers 
through the mails an ordinary mode of publication?" Further: 
"Now against the objects of this bill he had not a word to say; 
but with constitutional lawyers there was a great difference be-
tween the object and the means to carry it into effect .... Congress 
78 CONG. GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st sess. 437 (1836). 
79 Id. at 442; 12 CONG. DEBATES, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 1737 (1836). 
80 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st sess. 299 (1836). During the course of the debates 
Calhoun pointed out that "if they once acknowledged the power of Congress to suppress 
the transmission of these incendiary papers directly, and to say what was incendiary, it 
would be conceding to it to decide what was not incendiary, as they were in their nature 
correlative rights. • • ." Id. at 298. 
81 CONG. GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st sess., 439 (1836). 
82Ibid. 
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had not the power, drawn from the character of the paper, to 
decide whether it should be carried in the mail or not; for such 
decision would be a direct abridgment of the freedom of the 
press. He confessed that he was shocked at the doctrine. He looked 
back to the alien and sedition laws which were so universally 
condemned throughout the country .... "83 
Meanwhile the House Committee on the Post Office and 
Post Roads brought in a bill which took an opposite position 
to that in Calhoun's bill: the House Committee's bill, as finally 
enacted, made it a penal offense if any postmaster should "un-
lawfully detain in his office any letter, package, pamphlet, or 
newspaper, with intent to prevent the arrival and delivery of the 
same to the person or persons to whom such letter, package, 
pamphlet or newspaper may be addressed or directed .... "84 
The House passed the bill in June. The Senate, after defeating 
Calhoun's bill, accepted the House bill, with a few minor changes; 
and in July the two houses were brought into agreement. This 
act in principle prohibited the post office department from cen-
soring the mail: its job was simply that of carrying it. Years later 
Judge Thurman W. Arnold in the concluding paragraph of his 
opinion in the Esquire85 case aptly stated: 
"We believe that the Post Office officials should exper-
ience a feeling of relief if they are limited to the more prosaic 
function of seeing to it that 'neither snow nor rain nor heat 
nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift com-
pletion of their appointed rounds.' "86 
The Supreme Court in Ex parte ]ackson81 in an opinion by 
Justice Field, in the course of a review of the proceedings in the 
Senate on President Jackson's proposal and Calhoun's bill, com-
mented: 
" ... In the Senate, that portion of the message was referred 
to a select committee, of which Mr. Calhoun was chairman; 
83 Id. at 437, 440. These debates are also reported in 12 CONG. DEBATES, 24th Cong., 
1st sess., 1722-1737 (1836). For other accounts of this important incident in our history 
see 6 MCMASTER, HisrORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 288-291 (1883); NYE, 
FETIERED FREEDOM 60-65 (1949); Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and of the Mails," 36 
MICH. L. REv. 703 at 717-723 (1938). 
84 Act of July 2, 1836, §32, 5 Stat. 87. 
8G Esquire v. Hannegan, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 49, affd. sub nom. Hannegan v. 
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). 
86 Id. at 55. 
87 96 U.S. 727 (1878). 
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and he made an elaborate report on the subject, in which he 
contended that it belonged to the States, and not to Congress, 
to determine what is and what is not calculated to disturb 
their security, and· that to hold otherwise would be fatal to 
the States; for if Congress might determine what papers were 
incendiary, and as such prohibit their circulation through 
the mails, it might also determine wh~t were not incendiary, 
and enforce their circulation."88 
Two days before President Jackson made his proposal the 
Richmond Compiler set forth the First Amendment together 
with comparable provisions from state constitutions with this 
introduction: "The following are extracts from the constitutions 
of the United States and the several states of the union, from 
which it will be seen that no law can constitutionally be passed 
for the purpose of restraining the fanatics of the north in their 
crusade against our rights."89 
Thus on two great occasions prior to Schenck v. United 
88 Id. at 734. 
89 49 NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER 236 (1835). Of course the Southern states by local 
measures tried to prevent the distribution of abolitionist literature. Nye wrote: "Failure 
to control the distribution of abolitionist literature by federal legislation did not mean, 
however, that the mails were thrown open at once to the antislavery presses. Southern 
States which did not already have laws governing the publication and circulation of 
'incendiary' matter quickly passed them, and other states strengthened existing legislation. 
South Carolina depended upon its law of 1820, and Kentucky upon laws passed in 1799 
and 1831. North Carolina had passed similar legislation in 1830, Louisiana and Mississippi 
in 1831, and Alabama in 1832 and 1835. Maryland's law of 1835 sufficed for a time; Mis-
souri enacted legislation of the usual type in 1837; and Georgia relied upon local legisla-
tion. Virginia, in 1836, passed a law requiring postmasters to notify justices of the peace 
whenever they received 'incendiary' publications in their offices; that officer would then 
judge their offensiveness, burn them publicly if they violated the law, and arrest the 
addressee if he had subscribed to them with the aim of assisting an abolition society. 
ThroughotJt the years to 1861 the Southern states reaffirmed and strengthened their laws, 
adding new interpretations and closing loopholes. • • • 
"In general the Southern interpretation of the federal mails law of 1836 held that 
state laws, governing the reception and distribution of 'incendiary' matter through the 
post office, were supreme. Virginia's Attorney General Tucker summarized the Southern 
view, stating that the federal power over the mails ceased when the mails reached their 
destination; 'At that point, the power of the State becomes exclusive. Whether the 
citizens shall receive the mail matter, is a question exclusively for her determination.' 
Since most Southern states had statutes requiring inspection of the mails by the post-
master or local authorities, the federal law was effectively nullified. In the Yazoo case of 
1857 United States Attorney General Cushing gave this interpretation official sanction 
when he ruled that a Mississippi statute forbidding delivery of 'incendiary' matter was 
not in conflict with the federal law of 1836, and that no postmaster was required to 
deliver materials 'the design and tendency of which are to promote insurrections.' Similar-
ly, Postmaster General Holt in 1859 ruled that the Virginia statute of 1836 did not con-
flict with federal law. To the postmaster at Falls Church, Virginia, he wrote that any 
postmaster might, after inspection of the mails, withhold delivery of any matter of 
'incendiary character.' 'The people of Virginia,' he said, 'may not only forbid the in• 
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States90 this country's leaders refused to read exceptions into 
the First Amendment's unqualified prohibitions. On the first 
occasion, at the time of the Sedition Act of 1798, those leaders 
included the framers of the first ten amendments. On the second 
occasion, at the time of President Jackson's proposal of December 
1835, those leaders included men who were already past their 
early childhood when the first ten amendments were adopted. 
It would be difficult to suggest more authoritative interpretations. 
Deeds Not Words 
Madison's criticism in his Report of the bad tendency doc-
trine and his suggestion that federal power was limited to acts 
and could not apply to speech alone, Jefferson had made earlier 
and in a more direct and even stronger fashion. In his draft of 
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which he introduced 
into the Virginia Assembly in 1779, and which passed that bod_y 
in 1785, he stated: " ... that to suffer the civil magistrate to in-
trude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the pro-
fession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill 
tendency is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious 
liberty, because he being of course judge of that tendency will 
make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or con-
demn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or 
differ from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful pur-
poses of civil government, for its officers to interfere when prin-
ciples break out into overt acts against peace and good order .... "01 
And before Jefferson drafted this bill the Rev. Philip 
Furneaux, a dissenting divine, in one of a series of famous letter.s 
to Blackstone, which were published in book form in London in 
1770, and in Philadelphia three years later, had eloquently 
urged the same approach: 
"If it be objected, that when the tendency of principles 
is unfavourable to the peace and good order of society, as 
troduction and dissemination of such documents within their borders, but, if brought 
-there in the mails, they may, by appropriate legal proceedings have them destroyed.,... 
NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM 65-66, 68-69 (1949). See also Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and 
of the Mails," 36 MICH. L. REv. 703 at 719-725 (1938). 
90 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
912 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Boyd ed., 546 (1950); 12 LAWS OF Vmcma 
84 at 85 (Hening, 1823). 
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it may.be, it is the magistrate's duty then, and for that reason, 
to restrain them by penal laws: I reply, that the tendency of 
principles, though it be unfavourable, is not prejudicial to 
society, till it: issues in some overt acts against the publick 
peace and order; and when it does, then the magistrate's 
authority to punish commences; that is, he may punish the 
·overt acts, but not the tendency, which is not actually hurt-
ful; and, therefore, his penal laws should be directed against 
overt acts" only, which are detrimental to the peace and good 
order of society, let them spring from what principle they 
will; and not against principles, or the tendency of principles. 
"The distinction between the tendency of principles, and 
the overt acts arising from them, is, and cannot but be, ob-
serveq, in many cases of a civil nature; in order to determine 
the bounds of the magistrate's power, or at least to limit the 
exercise of it, in such cases. It would not be difficult to men-
tiqn customs and manners, as well as principles, which have 
a tendency unfavourable to society, and which, nevertheless, 
cannot be restrained by penal laws, except with the total 
destruction of civil liberty. And here, the magistrate must be 
~ontented with pointing his penal laws against the evil overt 
acts resulting from them. . . . Punishing a man for the tend-
ency of his principles, is punishing him before he is guilty, 
for fear he should be guilty."92 
So~ too, had Montesquieu, the oracle of the founding fathers,93 
?.-nd Jeremy Bentham; although Montesquieu had added a nulli-
fying qualification. Montesquieu in his L'Esprit des Lois (1748) 
in• a chapter entitled, "Of Indiscreet Speeches," had written: 
"Words do not constitute an overt act .... Words carried in-
to action assume the nature of that action. Thus a man who 
goes into a 'public market-place to incite the subject to revolt, 
incurs the guilt of high treason, because the words are 
joined to the action, and partake of its nature. It is not the 
words that are punished, but an action in which words are 
employed. They do not become criminal, but when they are 
annexed to a criminal action: everything is confounded, if 
'tvords are construed into a capital crime, instead of consid-
ering them only as a mark of that crime."94 
92 LETIERs TO THE HONOURABLE MR. jusr1CE BLACKSTONE 53.55 (1770). 
93 Of him Madison wrote, in discussing the idea of the separation of powers: "The 
-oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu." 
!!"HE FEDERALisr,-No. 47, Lodge ed., 300 (1923). 
94 Bk. 12, c. 12. 
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Bentham in his A Fragment on Government (1776), which_ 
was a criticism of Blackstone's exposition in his Commentaries on 
the nature of sovereignty, in explaining the difference betweer:( 
a free and a despotic government, stated that one of the dis-
tinguishing circumstances lay in "the security with which mal¥ 
contents may communicate their sentiments, concert their plans,. 
and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt;, 
before the executive power can be legally justified in disturbing 
them."95 
But Montesquieu's exception for the advocacy of violenc~ 
blurs the workable distinction between speech and criminal deeds,. 
with the double result that the exception not only is difficult' 
of application but also provides the basis for stultifying restric~ 
tions on speech. A striking idea is just as moving to action whether. 
stated philosophically in a seminar or shouted from the rostrum:, 
As Justice Holmes admitted in his dissenting opinion in Gitlow._ 
v. New York,96 "Every idea is an incitement."97 Besides, in Mark-
Anthony fashion, the advocacy of an immediate resort to violence 
may be couched in peaceful and submissive terms. Jefferson and 
Madison were wise enough not to follow Montesquieu's excep~ion .. 
The Court, however, in the application of Justice Holmes:, 
clear and present danger test, did make an exception under cer~ 
tain circumstances for the advocacy of violence. As a result the 
Court found itself at the last term drawing a distinction between 
the advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government . as "a 
rule or principle of action," proscribed in the charge in Dennis 
v. United States,98 and the advocacy of such overthrow as ~( 
"necessity" and a "duty," proscribed in the charge in the Yates,. 
Schneiderman and Richmond cases. The Court itself admitted 
that such distinctions "are often subtle and difficult to grasp."99. 
Justice Clark found them, and rightly so, "too 'subtle and difficult 
to grasp.' " 100 
Jefferson's classic statement from his draft of A Bill for &., 
tablishing Religious Freedom did not go wholly unnoticed. Jus-
tice Black in his concurring and dissenting opinion in the Yates; 
95 At p. 95, Harrison ed. (1948). 
96 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
117 Id. at 673. 
98 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
99 354 U.S. 326. 
100 Id. at 350. 
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Schneiderman and Richmond cases, in which Justice Douglas 
ioined, quoted the latter part of it.101 So, too, did Justice Douglas 
ib. his dissenting opinion in the Dennis case.102 
· The approach of Jefferson and Madison, and of Justices 
Black and Douglas is a farsighted one. If prevailing social struc-
tures provide a fair measure of equal justice, opportunity and 
freedom for all, speech will not overthrow them. On the other 
hand, if such structures are arbitrary and unjust, the suppression 
o£ speech will not save them. The measures of the czars of Russia 
left nothing to be desired in the way of suppression. Y~t their 
&"9Vernment came to a violent and bloody end. 
Under Madison and Jefferson's and Black and Douglas' view 
of the First Amendment, the advocacy of the violent overthrow 
of the government and even a conspiracy to advocate its violent 
overthrow would be entitled to protection. Under this view the 
Dennis case was wrongly decided. The advocacy provisions of 
Title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940,1°3 a title commonly 
known as the Smith Act after its principal draftsman, Congress-
man Howard W. Smith of Virginia, under which over 130 lead-
ers of the American Communist Party have been indicted and 
more than 100 have been convicted and sentenced to prison 
terms, 104 violate the First Amendment. A fortiori, so does the 
101 Id. at 340. 
102 341 U.S. 494 at 590. Cf. the statement of Chief Justice Warren in his concurring 
Qpinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 495 (1957): "The conduct of the de-
fendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a ,book or picture." And his statement 
in .his dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 at 446 (1957): 
.. It is the conduct of the individual that should be judged, not the quality of art or 
literature." 
103 See note 14 supra. 
104 When these cases reached the Supreme Court they fared indifferently. The first 
three judgments of conviction under the advocacy provisions which came to the Court 
were sustained. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), affirming (2d Cir. 1950) 183 
F. (2d) 201; Frankfeld v. United States, (4th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 679, affirming (D.C. Md. 
1951) 101 F. Supp. 449, cer!. den. 344 U.S. 922 (1953); United States v. Flynn, (2d Cir. 
1954) 216 F. (2d) 354, cert. den. 348 U.S. 909 (1955). But the next three were reversed. 
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), reversing (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 449, 
affirming (W .D. Pa. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 345; Yates v. United States, Schneiderman v. 
United States, Richmond v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), reversing (9th Cir. 1955) 
225 F. (2d) 146; Wellman v. United States, 354 U.S. 931 (1957), vacating judgment in 
(6th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 757. The two membership cases before the Court were docketed 
for reargument at the 1957 term and then reversed. See note 15 supra. Smith Act conspiracy 
convictions against American Communists were also pending for review or reconsideration 
in the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 
Th05C in the Second, Third and Tenth Circuits have resulted in reversals. United States 
v~ Silverman, (2d Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 671, pet. for cert. filed, 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 3178 
~o. 643); Bary v. United States, (10th Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 201; United States v. Kuzma, 
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membership provision of the Smith Act. To date, however, at 
least as to the advocacy provisions, the law has developed to 
the contrary. 
Picketing 
As a further result of failing to apply the workable distinc-
tion between speech and conduct the Court in picketing cases 
made an error in the opposite direction to that in the Smith Act 
cases: it treated conduct-for picketing is conduct-as protected 
under certain circumstances by the First Amendment, since it 
also involved speech. But picketing, even if peaceful, constitutes 
more than speech, as the Court itself recognized at the last term 
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.105 Jus-
tice Frankfurter in the Court's opinion quoted with approval 
this language from the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas 
in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl: 106 "Picketing by an organized 
group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a 
particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line 
may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of 
the nature of the ideas that are being disseminated."107 Picket 
lines involve a concert of action in the same fashion as do com-
binations in restraint of trade or to fix prices. Their primary 
purpose is not the dissemination of ideas but to bring about 
certain action on the part of employers. It takes considerable 
courage in today's world for many people to cross a picket line. 
There are valid reasons for the protection of peaceful picketing, 
but it is submitted that the First, or the First and the Fourteenth 
Amendments, are not among them. To base the protection of 
peaceful picketing on the First Amendment not only confuses 
the issues that are involved in the controversies between employ-
ers and employees, but also blurs the distinction that should be 
drawn between speech and conduct. Because of such confusion 
the Court in the last two decades in picketing cases, from Senn 
v. Tile Layers Union108 to International Brotherhood of Team-
(3d Cir. 1957) 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 2240 (Nov. 13, 1957). In the Silverman case, the court 
directed the dismissal of the indictment. In the Dennis, Frankfeld and Flynn cases a total 
-0f 28 defendants served prison terms. 
10:; 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
106 315 U.S. 769 at 776 (1942). 
101 354 U.S. at 289. 
10s 301 U.S. 468 (1937). 
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sters v. Vogt, Inc.,1°9 has, to use the language of Justice Douglas in 
his dissenting opinion in the latter case, "come full circle."110 
The confusion began in Thornhill v. Alabama,111 where the 
Court in an opinion by Justice Murphy identified peaceful 
picketing with freedom of speech and stated broadly: "In the 
circumstances of our times the dissemination of information 
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as with-
in that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. "112 Previously the Court had ruled, in Truax v. Corrigan,113 
a five-to-four decision, with the Court's opinion by Chief Justice 
Taft, that an Arizona statute for the protection of peaceful picket-
ing violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; and, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,114 another 
five-to-four decision, with Justice Brandeis ·writing the Court's 
opinion, that a comparable Wisconsin statute did not fall afoul 
either of that or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. After the Thornhill case the Court in American Federation 
of Labor v. Swing115 held an injunction against peaceful organ-
izational picketing, based on Illinois' common law policy against 
picketing, to be unconstitutional, saying: "The right of free com-
munication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to work-
ers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in 
his employ."116 But in the Vogt case at the last term the Court 
reached the opposite result with reference to another comparable 
Wisconsin statute. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent-
ing opinion in the latter case, the "factual record" in the Swing 
case cannot be distinguished from that in the Vogt case.117 In 
both cases the Court's opinion was by Justice Frankfurter. 
What happened was that the Court began to retreat from the 
Thornhill and Swing opinions at the very next term after the 
latter decision. In Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe118 the Court 
held that Texas could enjoin as a violation of its antitrust law 
picketing by unions of a restaurant to bring pressure on its owner 
109 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
110 Id. at 295. 
111 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
112 Id. at 102. 
113 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
114 301 U.S. 468 (1937). 
115 312 U.S. 321 (1941). 
116 Id. at 326. 
117 354 U.S. 284 at 295-296. 
11s 315 U.S. 722 (1942). 
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with respect to the use of non-union labor by a contractor of 
the restaurant owner in the construction of a building having 
nothing to do with the restaurant. There followed in rather rapid 
succession, among others, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,119 
Teamsters Union v. Hanke120 and Plumbers Union v. Graham.121 
In the Giboney case the Court held that Missouri could enjoin 
picketing by a union, seeking to organize peddlers, of a whole-
sale dealer to induce it to refrain from selling to nonunion ped-
dlers. In the Hanke case the Court decided that the State of Wash-
ington could enjoin the picketing of a business, conducted by the 
owners themselves without employees, in order to secure com-
pliance with a demand to become a union shop. In the Graham 
case it held that Virginia could enjoin, as a violation of its right 
to work law, picketing which announced that nonunion men 
were employed on a building job. Then came the Vogt case. 
Justice Douglas stated in his dissenting opinion: "Today, the 
Court signs the formal surrender. State courts and state legisla-
tures cannot fashion blanket prohibitions on all picketing. But, 
for practical purposes, the situation now is as it was when Senn v. 
Tile Layers Union ... was decided. State courts and state legis-
latures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress any 
particular picket line for any reason other than a blanket policy 
against all picketing."122 This is as the law ought to be. Much of 
the intermediate confusion could have been avoided had the 
First Amendment through the Fourteenth not been made the 
basis for the decisions in the Thornhill and Swing cases.123 
Early State Power 
In addition to blurring the distinction between speech and 
conduct by restricting the limits of the First Amendment in the 
field of speech by the application of Justice Holmes' clear and 
110 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
120 339 U.S. 470 (1950). 
121 345 U.S. 192 (1953). 
122 354 U.S. 284 at 297. . 
123 For discussions pro and con on the point see Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 
56 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HARV. 
L. REV. 513 (1943); Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply," 56 HARV. L. REv. 532 
(1943); Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine," 41 MICH. L. REV. 
1037 (1943). See also FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1949) ("Picketing 
is indeed a hybrid, comprising elements of persuasion, information, and publicity .to-
gether with elements of non-verbal conduct, economic pressure and signals for action."). 
368 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
present danger test, on the one hand, and extending it to include 
certain conduct in the picketing cases, on the other, the Court 
complicated the free speech picture still further by holding at 
the last term in four of a series of five cases that so-called obscene 
utterances did not fall within the protection of the First Amend-
ment at all.12-1 The basis for such an interpretation was this: "The 
guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States 
which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute 
protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided 
for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either 
blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes."125 
But the difficulty with the Court's stand is that the framers 
. of the First Amendment, as their opposition to the Sedition Act 
of 1798 emphasized, intended the states to have certain powers 
over speech which they expressly sought to deny to the federal 
government. Specifically they took the position that the states 
and not the federal government had jurisdiction. over the offense 
of seditious libel. They would have taken the same position with 
reference to the offenses of blasphemy and profanity, and, later 
still, obscenity-the first reported decision in this country sus-
taining a conviction for obscenity did not occur until 1815,126 
124 Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): Kingsley Books, 
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Adams Newark Theater Co. v. Newark, 354 U.S. 
931 (1957). 
125 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 482 (1957). 
126 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815). As late as 1795 an edition 
of Hawkins read: "And it seems, that a writing full of obscene ribaldry, without any 
kind of reflection upon any one, is not punishable at all by any prosecution at common 
Jaw, as I have heard agreed in the court of king's bench .... " 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN, Leach ed., 130. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 508 (1957) (dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Douglas); GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL 
R.EsTRAINTS 99 (1956); Alpert, "Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature," 52 HARV. L. 
REv. 40 at 47 (1938); Grant and Angoff, "Massachusetts and Censorship," 10 BoST. UNIV. 
L. REv. 36 at 52 (1930); Lockhart and McClure, "Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and 
the Constitution," 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 at 324, n. 200 (1954); note, 52 MICH. L. REv. 
575 at 576 (1954). 
Likewise the first state legislation on the subject did not -begin to appear until 1821. 
Conn. Stat. Laws 165 (1821). 
But the Court in the Roth case stated: "At the time of the adoption of the First 
Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently 
contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended 
for speech and press." 354 U.S. 476 at 483 (1957). In support of this statement the Court 
cited the Sharpless case, supra, and Knowles v. State, 3 Day (Conn.) 103 (1808), and Com-
monwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821), as well as the statute of Connecticut of 1821 
and one of New Jersey of 1798, among others. Knowles was charged with exhibiting an 
indecent and unseemly picture "representing a horrid and unnatural monster," but on 
appeal his conviction was reversed. Also, the New Jersey statute to which the Court 
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more than a quarter of a century after the first Congress proposetl 
the first ten amendments. A consideration of the intent of the 
founders of this country with reference to state power over speech- . 
will underscore the fact that they intended the federal govern-
ment to have no power in this area. 
First, however, some qualifying observations about the Court's 
statement are in order. The ten states to which the majority 
opinion refers are Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Vermont and Virginia. These reduce to nine as of the date when 
the first Congress proposed the first ten amendments (September 
25, 1789); for the cited constitution of one of them, Delaware, 
dates from 1792.127 In the second place these state constitutional 
provisions were not always in as sweeping terms as the First 
Amendment. For example, the Vermont constitution of 1786 
expressly identified freedom of speech and of the press with dis-
cussions of "the transactions of government."128 In the third -
place these state constitutional provisions at times contained ex-
ceptions. The Pennsylvania constitution of 1790 and the Dela-
ware constitution of 1792 had exceptions for seditious libel, that 
of South Carolina of 1790 for licentiousness, and that of Mary-
land of 1776 for immorality. The Pennsylvania constitution of 
1790 provided that in seditious libel prosecutions truth was to 
be a defense and "the jury shall have a right to determine the 
law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other 
cases."120 The South Carolina constitution of 1790 in providing 
for religious freedom expressly stated: "That the liberty of con-
referred is not in point. It prohibited stage performances ,but did not deal with obscenity. 
New Jersey Laws 331-332 (Paterson, 1800). It would thus seem that the Court's statement • 
is somewhat too broad. 
However, an act of 1711 of the colony of Massachusetts Bay made it an offense to 
write, print or publish "any Filthy Obscene or Prophane Song, Pamphlet, Libel or Mock-
Sermon, in Imitation or in Mimicking of Preaching, or any other part of Divine Worship • 
• • • " Acts and Laws of Massachusetts Bay 219 at 222 (1714). On the basis of this act 
the Court, in the Roth case, concluded: "Thus, profanity and obscenity were related<· 
offenses." 354 U.S. 476 at 483 (1957). One will have to concede the validity of this con-
clusion. The attitude which excluded blasphemy from free speech guarantees would 
deal similarly with obscenity when that offense developed. 
127 354 U.S. 476 at 482, n. 10 (1957). 
128 C. 1, §15. The Court referred to the declaration of rights in the Vermont con-
stitution of 1777, c. 1, §14, which did not contain this restricting identification. 
120 Art. IX, §7. The Delaware constitution of 1792 contained a similar provision. 
Art. I, §5. 
Again, in the case of Pennsylvania, the Court referred to the declaration of rights 
in an earlier constitution, that of 1776, art. 12, which again was more broadly drawn. 
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i science thereby declared shall not be so construed as to excuse acts 
: of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
i or safety of this State."130 The Maryland declaration of rights of 
1776 had this exception: " ... unless, under colour of religion, 
· any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the 
. State, or shall infringe the laws of morality .... "131 By way of con-
t trast the First Amendment provided without qualification: "Con-
·. gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
· .of the press .... " · 
i In the fourth place the states did not always observe their 
., own constitutional provisions. As Madison pointed out when he 
submitted his proposed amendments to the first Congress in 
{ June 1789: " ... there are a few particular States in which some 
; of the most valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been 
. violated' .... " 132 
Ho~ever, the main difficulty with the Court's action in sus-
i taining ihe validity of a federal obscenity statute lies in the fact 
that the· framers of the First Amendment intended that what-
ever governmental power existed over utterances was to reside 
, in the states rather than the federal government. The proceed-
. ings of the first Congress on the first ten amendments show this; 
'i.the opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798 stressed it; and the 
· defeat of President Jackson's proposal for barring "incendiary 
. publications" from the mails reaffirmed the point. 
!' • One of Madison's proposed amendments provided: "No State 
; shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of 
:the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."133 This proposed 
amendment came from Madison alone. No state convention 
asked for it. In offering it he explained: ". . . it is proper that 
·.'every Government should be disarmed of powers which trench 
· upon those particular rights. I know, in some of the State con-
~ stitutions, the power of the Government is controlled by such a 
· declaration; but others are not. I cannot see any reason against 
130 Art. VIII, §1. 
131.Art. XXXIII. Of the remaining five there were two whose constitutions provided 
that freedom of the press was to remain inviolate. GA. CONST., art. LXI (1777), art. IV, 
,§3 (1789); N,H. CoNsr., art. I, §22 (1784). The :remaining three provided .that the liberty 
'of the press was. not to be restrained. MASS. CoNsr., Declaration of Rights, art. XVI 
;(1780); N.C. CoNsr. Declaration of Rights, art. XV (1776); VA. CoNsr., Declaration of 
Rights, §12 (1776). 
t 132 I ANNALS OF CONG., Gales comp., 439 (1834). 
133 Id. at 435. , 
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obtaining even a double security on those points; and nothing :· 
can give a more sincere proof of the attachment of those who 1 
oppose this constitution to these great and important rights than : 
to see them join in obtaining the security I have now proposed; 
because it must be admitted, on all hands, that the State Govern- 1 
ments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the . 
General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously 
guarded against."134 
The House sent Madison's proposals to a special committee ' 
of which he was one of the members. The special committee , 
revised this proposal to read: "No State shall infringe the equal. 
rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press, 1 
nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases."133 
Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina objected i 
to it: "This is offered, I presume, as an amendment to the con- 1 
stitution of the United States, but it goes only to the alterations , 
of the constitutions of particular States. It will be much better, 
I apprehend, to leave the State Governments to themselves, and 
not to interfere with them more than we already do; and that 
is thought by many to be rather too much. I therefore move, 
sir, to strike out these words." J 
But: "MR. MADISON conceived this to be the most valuable ' 
amendment in the whole list. If there was any reason to restrain ·. • 
the Government of the United States from infringing upon 
these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should \ 
be secured against the State Governments. He thought that if . 
they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide : . 
against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grate- 1 
ful to the people."136 
Madison won out in the House. After a further minor re- . :. 
vision this proposal went to the Senate in this form: "No State· I 
shall infringe the right of trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor 
the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the , 
press."137 But in the Senate the position which Tucke'r took 'in 
the House won out, and this proposal was rejected. 
The national debate on the Sedition Act of I 798 under-
lined the point that the states had a certain amount of power 
134 Id. at 441. 
135 See id. at 755. 
136 Ibid. 
137 5 DocUl\IENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 193, 197 (Dept .. of State 1905).' 
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over utterances which was denied the federal government. In 
--Ole debates in Congress Nicholas of Virginia, Nathaniel Macon 
. of North Carolina and Edward Livingston of New York all drew 
a distinction between state and federal power. Nicholas: " ... He 
'had heard it said that all the States take cognizance of offenses 
-of this sort. But does that give the power to the General Gov-
ernment? Because the States declare certain things offences, have 
· the General Government power over the like offences? If so, 
it would have a concurrent power with all the State Governments, 
. which, he believed, would be a novel idea. Indeed, he was utterly 
at a loss to find any ground upon which to found a law of this 
· kind. He was confident there was none."138 
Macon: " ... He thought this subject of the liberty of the 
· -press was sacred, and ought to be left where the Constitution 
· had left it. The States have complete power on the subject, and 
when Congress legislates, it ought to have confidence in the 
States, as the States ought also to have confidence in Congress, 
or our Government is gone .... "139 
Livingston: " ... Every man's character is protected by law, 
and every man who shall publish a libel on any part of the 
Government, is liable to punishment. Not, said Mr. L., by laws 
. which we ourselves have made, but by laws passed by the several 
States. And is not this most proper? . . .''140 · 
Madison took the same position in his Address and subsequent 
::Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798. In his Address he 
stated: " ... But the laws for the correction of calumny were not 
defective. Every libellous writing or expression might receive 
. -its punishment in the State courts .... "141 In his Report he 
· added that libelled federal officials had to seek redress "under 
, ilie same laws, and in the same tribunals, which protect their 
2.:fives, their liberties, and their properties."142 
A few months before his second inauguration Jefferson wrote 
• , to Mrs. John (Abigail) Adams, the wife of his political opponent 
• ·-in the presidential campaign of 1800: 
" ... Nor does the opinion of the unconstitutionality, & 
consequent nullity of that law [Sedition Act of 1798], re-
138 ANNALS OF CONG. 2142, 5th Cong., 2d sess. (1798). 
-189 Id. at 2152. 
• · 140 Id. at 2153. 
1416 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 334 (1906). 
il42 Id. at 393; 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed., 57!1 (1881). 
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move all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of slan-
der, which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth 
and falsehood, in the U.S. The power to do that is fully 
possessed by the several State Legislatures. It was reserved to 
them, & was denied to the General Government, by the 
Constitution, according to our construction of it. While 
we deny that Congress have a right to control the freedom 
of the press, we have ever asserted, the right of the States, 
and their exclusive right, to do so."143 
In his second inaugural he took occasion to restate his position: 
"During this course of administration and in order to dis-
turb it, the artillery of the press has been levelled against 
us, charged with whatsoever its licentiousness could devise 
or dare. These abuses of an institution so important to free-
dom and science, are deeply to be regretted, inasmuch as 
they tend to lessen its usefulness, and to sap its safety; they 
might, indeed, have been corrected by the wholesome pun-
ishments reserved and provided by the laws of the several 
States against falsehood and defamation; but public duties 
more urgent press on the time of public servants, and the 
offenders have therefore been left to find their punishment 
in the public indignation."144 
The defeat of President Jackson's proposal demonstrated once 
again that the only power that existed over utterances, as such, 
resided in the states. In the words of Clay, "The States alone 
had the power, and their power was ample for the purpose."145 
There is an additional consideration: the framers of the 
First Amendment, in order to make doubly certain that the 
federal government did not have or exercise any powers other 
than those which the Constitution either expressly or by im-
plication delegated to it, provided in the Tenth Amendment: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." Madison had originally pro-
posed: "The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
148 Letter of Sept. 11, 1804. 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Fed. ed. by Ford, 
89-90 n. (1905). A decade and a half earlier he had written Madison from Paris: " ••• A 
declaration that the federal government will never restrain the presses from printing 
any thing they please, will not take away the liability of the printers for false facts 
printed .••• " 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Boyd ed., 440, 442 (1956). 
144 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Fed. ed. by Ford, 133-134 (1905). 
H5 CONG. GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st sess., 439 (18!!6). 
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spectively."146 As revised this became the Tenth Amendment. 
An effort was twice made, once by Tucker147 and again by 
Gerry, 148 to carry the idea embodied in this amendment still 
further by inserting the word "expressly" before the word "dele-
gated." This was the way it had been in the Articles of Confed-
eration.149 Madison opposed Tucker's proposal "because it was 
impossible to confine a Government to the exercise of express 
powers; there must necessarily be admitted powers by implica-
tion, unless the Constitution descended to recount every mi-
nutiae. "150 Madison's view prevailed. However, in the area cov-
ered by the First Amendment the Tenth Amendment meant 
that whatever power there was over utterances, as such, resided, 
not in the federal government, but in the states or in the people. 
Nevertheless the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court devel-
oped otherwise. 
[To be concluded.] 
146 1 ANNALS OF CONG., Gales comp., 436 (1834). 
147 Id. at 761. 
148 Id. at 767. 
149 Art. II, quoted in note 40 supra. 
150 1 ANNALS OF CONG., Gales comp., 761 (1834). 
